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The first round of the conflict between the Yemeni government and the Shiites started in 2004 and 
since then, has gone through six stages. These conflicts, which first began as minor skirmishes, 
gradually took on new dimensions and increased in intensity and extensiveness in such a way that at 
the sixth stage of the war, the Saudi Arabian air force and the United States officially entered the battle, 
each under its own pretext. The purpose of this research paper is twofold: first, to study the reasons 
and roots of these wars and second, to use “fuzzy models and maps” in the analysis of the factors 
which play a role in this crisis. 
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Yemen, as one of the oldest and most important centers of monotheism and Islam in the 
Middle Eastern and North African region, borders with Saudi Arabia to the north, the Gulf of 
Eden to the south, Oman to the East, and the Red Sea to the west. It has an area of 527,970 
km2 and a population of about 25 million people. Its official religion is Islam and the 
followers of the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam and the Zaidi school of Shiite Islam constitute 
the religious majority of the country (CIA 2005). 
In the wake of the December 1989 agreement on the unification of South and North 
Yemens, the two Yemens were unified. The Republic of Yemen was thus established in 22 
May 1990. South Yemen had been a colony under the British rule since 1838 and gained its 
independence on 30 November 1967. South Yemen then became the People’s Republic of 
Yemen and joined the Eastern camp within the bipolar system during the Cold War period. 
North Yemen, which was dominated by the Ottoman Empire until 1918, came under the 
control of Zaidi imams after World War I and the collapse of the empire. It then fell into the 
hands of the revolutionaries in 1962, under the influence of the wave of Arab unity in Egypt 
and with the help of that country’s army and through a military coup. 
Yemen has a strategic position within the region because it overlooks the strait of Bab el-
Mandeb and its ability to control it through the Perim Island, which divides the strait into two 
waterways, and also because of other important islands as Socotra. This is why the country 
has always been in the center of the attention of international, as well as regional, powers 
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(Ministry of Foriegn Affiars of Iran 1997). 
The first Zaidi Shiite government was established in Yemen by Yahia Ibn al-Hassan Ibn 
al-Qasim al-Hadi, entitled “al-Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq” in 284 A.H. /897 A.D. That 
government lasted, continuously and intermittently, for almost one thousand years, up to the 
September 1962 Revolution. The Zaidi Shiites mostly reside in the northern provinces of the 
country. The Sa’dah province is the main center of Shiite presence in the history of Yemen 
(Ahmad 1996). 
With the collapse of the Zaidi system of Imams and in the period from 1962 to the 
unification of the two Yemens in 1990, the Salafis, who emerged in the second half of the 
20th century and regarded themselves as the forerunners of the genuine Islam, could 
penetrate the Yemeni society and attract followers among the Shafi’i Sunnis and the Zaidi 
Shiites, while everybody was aware of the Salafis’ hostility toward Zaidis’ Shiite beliefs. 
Since the early 1970s, Allamah Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi, one of the most well-known 
Zaidi clerics of Yemen, along with a number of other clerics who found their Shiite identity 
being threatened by the Wahhabis and the Salafis, called for a revival of the Zaidi 
community. He made some efforts in this respect (ICG 2009). 
These efforts were mostly in the form of religious propagation, publication of books, 
setting up libraries and organizing courses for teaching of the Qur’an and its exegesis. Isam 
Imad, the speaker of the Yemeni Council of the Shiites, believes that the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran with the leadership of his Excellency Imam Khomeini in the first 
decade of the 15th century A.H., led to the moral invigoration of the Shiites in Yemen, at the 
face of their Salafi rivals. 
With the unification of the two Yemens and, subsequently, the establishment of a multi-
party system in the country, the Zaidi revivalists found another way to express their claims 
and achieve their objectives. Sayyid Husain Badruddin al-Houthi, the son of Allamah Sayyid 
Badruddin, chose the “al-Haqq” party and the “al-Shabab al-Mu’min” group. Within the 
framework of this party, he and Sheikh Abdullah al-Razami win two seats in the parliament 
in the first parliamentary elections of 1993, representing the Sa’dah province for four years 
(ICG 2009). 
In 1997, due to the differences which arose between the high ranking members of “al-
Haqq” party, Sayyid Husain al-Houthi left the party and concentrated his efforts on religious 
propagation and the “al-Shabab al-Mu’min” group. These efforts included reviving the Shiite 
religious rituals and ceremonies, such as the Ghadir feast and the Ashura ceremonies. He 
also taught courses on teaching the Quran and its exegesis in the mosques (ibid.). 
In the aftermath of the September 11 incident in 2001, the U.S. launched its war against 
terrorism and subsequently attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. The Yemeni government declared 
its alliance with the U.S. and emphasized its cooperation. In response, the members of “al-
Shabab al-Mu’min” shouted slogans of “Allahu-Akbar, Allahu-Akbar, Allahu-Akbar, al-
mawtu li-Amrica, al-mawtu li-israel, al-la’natu ‘alal-yahud, al-nasru lil-Islam” in the 
mosques. They continued to do so after the obligatory daily prayers (ibid.). It did not take 
long for this slogan to gain popularity among the general public. The Yemeni government, 
however, took a stance against the slogan. The government felt threatened by such 
expression of hatred and antipathy toward the U.S. and the Israel. The government thus 
ordered the prosecution and arrest of all of those who shouted such slogans (Thabit 2004). 
As will be discussed later, the continued crisis and conflict between the government and 
the Shiites in northern Yemen began in 2004 and went through six stages until 2006. Each 
specialist analyzed or described the crisis based on his or her own mindset and ideological 
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orientation; some analyses, influenced by the media propaganda and their guidelines, focused 
on one or two factors, and ignored the other factors and the magnitude of their influence on 
the crisis. The authors of this paper believe that the factors that caused and sustained the 
crisis, can be identified. The purpose of this research is to assess the roots of the crisis as 
recognized by the experts using a tool called “fuzzy cognitive maps”, and to demonstrate 
which one of these factors played a greater role in the continuation of the crisis. For example, 
one may consider the ideological differences between the Shiites and the Salafis as the main 
cause of the crisis, while the other may focus on the economic aspects such as poverty, an 
underdeveloped economy, and the lack of fair distribution of wealth. It is difficult to say 
which of these arguments are more convincing. However, if experts from these two schools 
of thought are asked to choose the more influential factor, both will argue that his or her own 
approach is more plausible than the other. Now, let us assume the position of a decision-
maker. Which approach must one choose in order to help resolve the crisis? Fuzzy cognitive 
maps are a tool by which one can assess the level of influence of all of the recognized factors. 
It enables the decision-maker to define his policy based on a greater awareness of the crisis 
and expert opinions. This research introduces fuzzy cognitive maps as an effective method of 
analysis. With the help of fuzzy cognitive maps, the researcher can accurately determine the 
direction of each factor’s influence. 
Fuzzy cognitive maps act on the basis of the fuzzy theory, which was initially introduced 
by Lotfi Zadeh in 1965. According to this theory, ambiguity is a natural attribute of science. 
Zadeh believed that it is imperative to construct such models that depict ambiguity as a part 
of a phenomenon. In the Aristotelian logic, there is a correct-incorrect categorization. Every 
factor, which has an effect on a phenomenon, is either correct or incorrect. According to the 
Aristotelian logic, the statement “The weather is cold” does not basically determine the 
extent of weather’s coldness, because the extent of weather’s coldness varies for different 
persons. However, in the fuzzy logic, there are statements which are partly correct and partly 
incorrect. For example, the above statement is fuzzy in nature, the correctness of which is 
sometimes low, and sometimes high, and this statement is sometimes always correct, 
sometimes always incorrect, and sometimes correct to some extent (Smithson 2006). 
Now that we understood the purpose and the method, let us turn to the descriptive study 
of the crisis of conflict between the government and the Shiites of Yemen, and what has 
happened since 2004 until the end of the sixth stage of the war. 
 
 
2. THE WARS BETWEEN THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT AND THE SHIITES  
OF THE COUNTRY 
 
2.1. The First War 
 
On 18 June 2004, during bouts of clashes between members of the “Al-Shabab Al-
mo’men” and the police, three policemen were killed. Following this incident, the governor 
of “Saada”, issued arrest warrants of Sayed Hossein Alhusi and other members of the group. 
After hiding out for three months resisting the authorities, he was killed on September 10 in a 
shelter in the “Marran” mountains, 30 km southwest of Saada. Before dying, he declared his 
and other members of group’s adherence to the system, in a letter dated June 26, to Ali 
Abdullah Salih, President of Yemen, who has been ruling the country for 32 years since 1978. 
In the letter, he spoke of the Yemeni government’s cooperation with the United States, and 
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argued that Saudi Arabia’s policies towards Yemen, in particular the directed at the 
predominantly Shiite province, a the main causes of the conflict (ICG 2009). Allameh Seyed 
Badr-o-din Alhusi declared in a statement that his son was only defending Islam. 
 
2.2. The Second War and the Third War 
 
In March 2005, harsh accusations were exchanged between the Yemeni President, Ali 
Abdullah Salih, and Allamah Sayyid Badruddin al-Houthi and Sheikh Abdullah al-Razami. 
President Ali Abdullah Salih accused the Shiites of trying to overthrow the republican 
system to restore the Zaidi Imamate system, while Allamah Badruddin accused the President 
and the government of having failed to do anything to end the disputes. The Yemeni 
government also tried to portray the Houthis as a terrorist group responsible for the 
operations launched against government officials and foreign diplomats (ICG 2009). 
The second stage of the war began with army’s attack on the North and West of “Saada” 
and cities including “Almajz,” “Sahar,” and “Baghem”. After two month, the army declared 
victory and the war appeared as if it had ended in May 2005. Experts considered the third 
stage of the war as something that did not bring any real resolution to the disputes, and rather 
a continuation of the second period of the war, which officially began when a tribal conflict 
between the two sides arose in late 2005 and early 2006.          
The main characteristic of the third stage of the war was the rise of Sayyid Abdolmalek 
al-Houthi, Sayyid Husain al-Houthi's brother, to the Houthis’ leadership. The upcoming 2006 
presidential elections led to a temporary cessation of the army’s attacks as well as a 
declaration of ceasefire (ICG 2009). 
 
2.3. The Fourth War 
 
In February and June of 2007, the government accused the Houthis of threatening the 
Jews in the Sa’dah province. Although the Houthis denied this accusation, it provided 
sufficient excuse to launch another war. 
New period of war continued with more intensity than before. It became more official 
and the tribes were actively used. The fourth period of war ended with intermediation efforts 
by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and a delegation from the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar. The Doha agreement was signed on February 2, 2008, 
and the Qatar government promised to send necessary aid to rebuild the war-torn regions. 
(Ibid).   
 
2.4. The Fifth War 
 
Doha agreement did not last long and the both sides accused each other of violation of 
provisions. The fifth war began in March 2008 and expanded into some sectors of Sana’a, 
the capital of Yemen. At this time, “Haras-al-Jomhouri,” commanded by Ahmad Ali Salih, 
Yemeni President’s son, entered the battlefield. Some of the experts argued that the 
competition between General Ahmad Ali Salih and Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, Army 
Commander, gave new dimensions to the crisis (Nasir 2009). This phase of the war ended on 
January 17, 2008 with the army’s declaration of unilateral ceasefire, which coincided with 
30th year of Ali Abdullah Salih’s presidency.  
In addition, other reasons such as the government’s fear of losing control over the war, as 
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well as the intermediation of the local activists, and criticism from human right organizations 
against the grave conditions of war victims, led to the temporary end of the war (Hamidi 
2009).  
 
2.5. The Sixth War 
 
The end of the fifth phase of the war had no clear horizon. Most experts anticipated the 
war to resume. The sixth war began in August 11, 2008 with the kidnapping of several 
foreign tourists in Yemen and the Houthis being accused of collaborating in the incident 
despite their denial (Rashid 2009). This operation expanded and continued with more 
intensity. The government named it the “Burnt Land” operation (De Johnsen 2009).  
One of the sixth war’s particular features was the participation of Saudi Arabia Air Force. 
Another was the involvement of the U.S. in the second stage. Scholars believe that the 
Yemeni government made great efforts to include the Houthi group in the U.S. terrorist 
organizations list (Al-Salahi 2009).  
Another feature of the sixth war was its extension to the Yemen and Saudi Arabia border 
regions. The war dragged on and after almost seven months, this phase of the war ended in 
January 2010, aided by local mediation and secret agreements. As the wars continue on and 
off, the authors of this paper concur that identifying the roots of the fundamental differences 
is an urgent task. 
 
 
3. ROOTS OF THE SIX FOLD WARS 
 
In their study of the wars in Yemen, the Middle East and Arab experts have pointed to 
one or more factors as the primary causes of the crisis. One of the studies belonging to this 
school is the book Al-Houthiyyah fi al-Yaman: Atma’ Maz-habiyyah fi Dhill al-Tahawwolat 
al-Dawliyyah (The Houthis phenomenon in Yemen: Religious Ambitions in the Light of 
International Developments), published by a team of experts of Al-Jazeera Studies Center in 
Doha, Qatar, in 2008. In their explanation of the developments of the crisis, the authors 
considered sectarian factors as the main causes of the war. 
The International Crisis Working Group dealt with the war in Yemen in its Report No. 86 
on the Middle East. The report argued that the crisis was caused by a set of factors with 
several root causes. This report was notable for its field research method and its real-time, 
accurate description of the crisis. However, it does not specify the extent of the influence of 
each factor. Abdul-Fattah Muhammad al-Batul, in “Khuyut al-Zalam: Asr al-Imamah al-
Zaidiyyah fi al-Yaman (Threads of Darkness: the Era of Zaidis’ leadership in Yemen),” 
employed a reductionist approach to study the history of Yemeni Shiites, and describes 11 
centuries of the history of Zaidi rule as the “thread of darkness,” i.e. the path of deviation. In 
that regard, this research concurs with the government’s perception of the Houthis (Al-
Batool 2007).  
In addition to the above studies, there is a huge volume of journalistic articles, interviews, 
television programs and conferences, where specialists and experts presented their 
viewpoints regarding the roots of the crisis. Many of these opinions have been collected and 
reviewed.  After a thorough review of the previous research performed on this topic, one can 
separate these root factors into two categories: internal and external. 
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3.1. Internal Factors 
 
Yemen’s fragile economy is one of the major causes of the crisis. Yemen is a low- 
income country, intensely dependent on its shrinking oil resources. Oil counts for almost 
25% of the GDP and 70% of the state’s revenue. Its real average annual GDP growth rate 
since 2000 has remained at 3~4 percent. The declining oil prices since mid-2008 have led to 
the aggravation of economic pressure on the country’s underdeveloped economy. To deal 
with the effects of declining oil resources, Yemen has tried to invigorate its non-oil sectors 
by implementing economic reforms plan which was drawn up in 2006. Based on this plan, 
the country managed to export liquefied natural gas for the first time in October 2009. 
Despite its ambitious plans, Yemen faces difficult long-term challenges such as the shortage 
in water resources and a high population growth rate (CIA 2009). 
Besides the overall economic problems, the lack of government’s attention to and 
investment in the Shiite provinces in the north, since the fall of Imamat Regime, has led to a 
degradation of the economic crisis in Shiite provinces (Shahmoradi 2009). 
Another factor is tribal social structure in Yemen, where the identities of the people are 
defined within a clan framework. Yemenis pursue their personal and family rights in this 
context (Hudson et al. 1994). It should be noted that since the third phase of the war, tribes 
have actively participated in the war; each tribe, according to its values and interests’ priority, 
has entered in war in favor of one side or another (Bahesin 2008). 
The third problem which has continued to attract the attention of the analysts, is the 
religious differences and the lack of religious tolerance. Considering that the Shiites’ protests 
had been against Saudi Arabia and the policies and excessive influence of Salafists, some 
scholars accept the factor of religious differences. To prove this issue, refer to Salafists’ 
assault on the Shiites’ sanctuaries, publication, and distribution of books against Zaidi 
clergies in the Shiite provinces, destruction of the sacred tombs and the Shiite mosques, and 
Shiites’ reaction to these procedures (Al-Salahi 2009; Hamidi 2009).            
These religious differences, though they do exist, are considered as less important factors 
by the Houthi leaders (Abullah 2009). This is because, before the crisis, Yemen was a very 
interesting example of peaceful coexistence between Zaidi Shiites and Shafi’i Sunni. 
Followers of both sects, unlike other countries and Islamic sects, prayed in the same mosques 
and behind the same Imam in Yemen. This was a unique example of unity. It also showed 
that there was little difference between Islamic sects.  
Besides the above factors, some scholars see the Yemeni government, the ruling system, 
and its inherent weakness as the main cause of the wars (Phillips 2005). They identify that 
the underdeveloped state of the political system, the disregard for pluralism, concentration of 
power in the military, the competition between Ahmed Ali Salih and General Ali Mohsen 
Al-Ahmar the commander of the Army over the presidency, and Ali Abdullah Salih’s 
intention to allow the presidency to be inherited, as the main causes of the conflicts (ICG 
2009). 
Some scholars also point to the Houthis as the main cause of conflicts. These analysts 
also believe that Zaidi Houthis have departed from the principles of Zaidia, and are biased 
towards the twelver Shiitesm which is officially represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
southern Iraq and Hizbullah of Lebanon (Al-Batool 2007; Abu Ras 2009).  
Beside the above factors, ‘Isam ‘Imad, the former speaker of the Assembly of the Shiites 
of Yemen, pointing  the parties to the conflict, identifies the whole government of Yemen, 
the ruling regime, and its intrinsic weaknesses as the main cause of the wars. He also 
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believes that the underdeveloped political system, the absence of pluralism, the extraordinary 
power of the army in the country, the rivalry between the president’s son Ahmad ‘Ali Salih, 
and the army’s commander General ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar over the presidency, and the 
desire of the current President to hand over the presidency to his son, as documented in ‘Ali 
Abdullah Salih, are among the main causes of the conflict (ICG 2009). 
 
3.2. External Factors 
 
Since the 2001 9/11 incident, the Houthis have continued to object to the war against 
Afghanistan and Iraq by NATO, the U.S., and the British governments under the pretext of 
fighting terrorism, the alliance and cooperation of the Yemeni government with the U.S., and 
the U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and the region including the U.S. support of 
Israel (Abullah 2009; Hatita 2009).  
In stressing the external factors affecting the crisis, some researchers view the conflict in 
Yemen as a proxy war. Citing the religious differences between the Wahhabis and the Shiites 
and the governments which represent them, namely Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran as evidence, they argue that this war is being fought in Yemen’s territory on behalf of 
these two countries (Badrkhan 2009; Abu Zahr 2010). 
Some scholars, emphasizing that the Houthis and the twelve Shiites in Islamic Republic 
of Iran share the same views on important doctrinal and international issues, believe that they 
are affiliated to the Islamic republic of Iran (Al-Harethi 2009). Other scholars go beyond the 
doctrinal issues, and claim that the Iranian militarily supports the Houthis (Al-Zayedi 2009; 
Al-Serjani 2009). However, this claim has repeatedly been rejected by the officials of Iran 
and Houthis leaders. The Houthis, in response to these claims, have countered that they have 
no affiliation to any group or country, and that these allegations are intended only to justify 
Saudi Arabia's military presence. They explain that they obtained their weapons as spoils of 
war obtained over several phases of the war. They also refer to the Yemeni tradition of 
carrying guns (Abullah 2009).    
Since the fourth war started based on the Yemeni government’s allegation that the 
Houthis threatened the Jews of the Sa’ada province, some researchers, in view of the fact that 
there has been no religious differences between the Shiites and the Shafi’i Sunnis, who 
constitute the religious majority of Yemen and, instead, the followers of these religions  
respected each other’s ideologies mutually and peacefully coexisted for one thousand years 
of Zaidi Imams’ rule, conclude that the policy of “divide-and-rule” is being pursued by Israel 
and that the crisis in Yemen and other parts of the Muslim world is an extension of the same 
policy (Mohammadifar 2006; Al-Museli 1998). The constant objection of the Houthis 
against Israeli policies toward Palestine and against the Yemeni foreign policy toward Israel, 
represented by its support of the peace process, and the inclusion of the statement “Down 
with the Jews” in their slogan, convinced us to also consider Israel as another external factor 
affecting the crisis in Yemen. 
Qatar is another external factor which, since the fourth war, has officially tried to play an 
effective role in the crisis. Qatar has propped itself as a regional mediator. Qatar has tried to 
play an important role in the settlement of the Yemeni crisis as well (Al-Hamiri 2009). In a 
visit to Yemen in May 2007, the Qatari emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah Aal Thani, 
declared his country’s readiness to intermediate between the main parties to the conflict. This 
intermediation led to the conclusion of the Doha accord (Hamidi 2009). Some analysts 
believe that the failure of this intermediation and its ensuing accord to prevent the 
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resumption of war is due to the ongoing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the 
region (ICG 2009). The Houthis believe that the Yemeni government took advantage of 
Qatar’s involvement as a means to obtain more financial and military support from Saudi 
Arabia (Abullah 2009). 
It is worth mentioning that the war, in spite of all the numerous financial and physical 
damages, has led to some gains for the Houthis. The most important among them is the 
acceptation and recognition by the Yemeni government of the Houthis – upon the signing of 
the Doha agreement – as well as the Yemeni public’s attention to the Shiites, and the loss of 
legitimacy of the Ali Abdullah Salih’s Regime. The Houthis led to shape a widespread 
popular protest in 2001 that fundamentally threatened the existence of regime. 
In addition to the above two cases, resistance and confrontation of the Houthis against the 
Yemeni army and the Saudi Arabia Air Force, and diffusion of images of bases near Saudi 
Arabian borders plundering their military equipment on the internet in sites including 
YouTube, have increased Houthis’ defense and military prestige. They have become a 
warning force for Saudi Arabia, because Shiites are the minority in Yemen, and are 
discontented with government policies.         
 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF FACTORS DERIVED ON THE BASIS OF FUZZY COGNITIVE 
MAPS (FCMS) 
 
The cognitive maps (CMs), which were introduced for the first time by Robert Axelrod, 
are used to solve problems with no definite structure. CMs are a representation of the causal 
relations among several objects or problems which include the experts’ opinions with respect 
to an abstract reality rather than a concrete one. CMs contain two main elements of concepts 
and causal relations which are represented under the rubrics of variables and the relations 
among the variables, respectively. Causal relations link the variables to each other and can be 
either positive or negative. The variables which lead to variation are called “cause” variables 
and the variables which are affected by the variations are called “effect” variables. In Figure 
1, an example of cognitive map is demonstrated (Mohammadian et al. 2006). 
Considering that CMs have a qualitative domain and taking the quantifying capability of 
the fuzzy logic into consideration, Kosko introduced fuzzy CMs with fuzzy weights (Kosko 
1986). In these maps, the paths, in addition to having a positive or negative causal direction, 












Figure 1. Cognitive map 
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each other. The fuzzy CMs eliminate the problem of indefiniteness in the actualization of 
general effect. These maps have been used for modeling political and social processes, 
identifying the managerial problems of organizations, information technology, and 
environmental problems (Mohammadian et al. 2006). In the present research, in order to take 
into account the vagueness of the factors affecting the Yemeni crisis as well as the complex 
interactions among them, fuzzy CMs have been utilized to find a model for the Yemeni crisis. 
Data collection was performed in two stages. In the first stage, the researchers identified 
the fundamental factors which influenced the crisis by studying the available resources, such 
as books, papers, and newspapers which had been published concerning the crisis. Upon the 
study’s completion, those factors were divided into two groups including the internal factors 
(such as economic problems, tribal structure, religious differences, the underdevelopment of 
political system or the absence of pluralism, the Yemeni Shiites and the Yemeni 
government) and the external factors (namely Israel, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar). 
After identifying these factors, the causal relationships among them, namely the direction of 
their effect as well as the magnitude of their effect on each other, had to be established.  
 
Table 1. Matrix filled out by one of the specialists 












Israel 0 - High - High - Low None None - High - High None Average 
U.S. - Average 0 
- Very 




Arabia None None 0 - Low - Low
- Very 





Average - Low 0 None None - Low None 
+ 




None None None None 0 - Low - Very high - High - Average - High 
Tribal 




Government None None None - Low 
- Very 














Problems None None None None - Average
- 
Average - High None 0 
-Very 
high 
Crisis None None None None - High - High - Very high - Very high - High 0 
 
Table 2. The criterion for scoring the fuzzy expressions 
None Low Average High Very High 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
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Table 3. The matrix of fuzzy numbers of one of the specialists 












Israel 0 -1 -0.75 -0.25 0 0 -0.75 -0.75 0 -0.5 
U.S. -0.5 0 -1 -0.25 0 0 -1 -0.25 0 -1 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25 -1 -1 -1 -0.75 -1 




0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.75 
Tribal 
structure 0 0 0 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.25 -0.5 
Yemeni 
government 0 0 0 -0.25 -1 -0.75 0 -1 -1 -1 
Religious 
differences 0 0 -0.25 -0.25 -1 -1 -0.75 0 -0.5 -1 
Economic 
problems 0 0 0 0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.75 0 0 -1 
Crisis 0 0 0 0 -0.75 -0.75 -1 -1 -0.75 0 
 
 
Therefore, the identified factors were designed in the form of a matrix and presented to four 
specialists in the field of Yemeni issues. The specialists were requested to determine the 
directions of their effects – as either positive (meaning the mitigation of the crisis) or 
negative (meaning the escalation of the crisis) – and the magnitude of their effects using the 
statements “none, little, average, high, and very high.” The specialists were also asked to 
delete the factors which they considered as redundant or to add the factors which had been 
overlooked. One of the matrices produced by the specialists is shown in table 1. 
After the matrices were filled out by the specialist, the matrices were transformed to 
fuzzy numbers according to the criterion set forth in (Hossain and Brooks 2008). The 
criterion is shown in table 2. Table 3 shows the fuzzy matrix related to table 1. 
After transforming the filled matrix by specialists to the matrix of fuzzy numbers, the 
matrices were combined together and the complete fuzzy matrix was reached. Then, they 
said matrix was entered in the FCM mapper (fcmmapper.com) so it could be analyzed. Table 
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Table 4. The fuzzy matrix of the complete cognitive map 
















Israel 0.00 -1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.00 -0.75 0.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.75 
U.S. -0.50 0.00 -1.00 -0.75 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.50 -0.75 -0.25 -0.75 -1.00 -0.25 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Iran -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 -0.25 0.50 
Qatar 0.25 0.00 -1.00 0.50 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.25 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Economic 
problems 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.50 -0.75 -1.00 -0.75 -1.00 
Social structure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.50 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 
Religious 




0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.75 -0.25 -0.50 0.00 -0.75 -0.75 -1.00 
Shiites of 
Yemen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -0.25 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.25 
Yemeni 
government 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.50 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.50 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 
Crisis 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -0.75 -1.00 -0.25 -1.00 -0.75 0.00 
 
 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE FUZZY MAPS 
 
Cognitive maps are complex systems because they comprise of a multitude of variables 
and causal connections among them. The analysis of such complex cognitive maps is very 
difficult. However, the tools offered by the matrix algebra of the graph theory provide some 
ways for the analysis of their structure. By testing the structure of the maps, one can 
determine how the specialists see the system; for example, whether, in their opinion, it is the 
internal factors or the external ones that influence the Yemeni crisis, or which one of the 
internal factors has the greatest effect. 
To analyze a cognitive map, the number of variables, denoted by “N”, and the number of 
connections among them, denoted by “C”, can be counted. Nevertheless, beside the number 
of connections and variables, the graph theory provides certain other indicators, too. The 
Density or Clustering Coefficient of a fuzzy cognitive map is the indicator of its connection 
which shows how interconnected or unconnected the map is (Özesmi and Özesmi 2004). In 
the present research, the density of the whole cognitive map is 0.6 which means that 60% of 
all possible paths are covered by the map. However, it shall be noted that density has a 
reverse relationship with the size of the network. Therefore, by the increase of the variables, 
the number of possible paths highly increases. Due to this dependence on the size of network, 
the density of network is not a useful tool for interpretation (De Nooy et al. 2005). But the 
measure of centrality is a very useful tool for comparing the variables in the map or the 
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network. The measure of the role of a certain variable in a cognitive map can be explored 
through calculation of its centrality which shows how a variable is connected to other 
variables and also how much the cumulative strength of these connections is. In fuzzy 
cognitive maps, contrary to cognitive maps, since the weights of the paths are also taken into 
consideration when calculating the centrality, a variable can have a high centrality, even 
though it has little connection with other variables, because it may have many weights with 
connected variables. 
Centrality is calculated by the addition of the “in-degree,” i.e. the number of the pointed 
edges which point toward a node or a variable, with the “out-degree,” i.e. the number of the 
vertexes or causal paths, which come out of a node or variable. Furthermore, if the out-
degree of a variable is positive and its in-degree equals to zero, it is called “transmitter” 
which indicates that the variable is a source of influence. But of the in-degree of a variable is 
positive and its out-degree equals to zero, it is called “receiver,” which indicates that the 
variable is influenced. The ordinary variables also have a positive out-degree and in-degree 
which indicates that the variable is either a source of influence or its receiver (Özesmi and 
Özesmi 2004). These indicators are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The graph indicators of the whole fuzzy cognitive map 
Density Total Nr. Factors Total Nr. Connections Nr. Transmitter Nr. Receiver Nr. Ordinary 
0.597222222 12 86 0 0 12 
 
Table 6. The graph indicators of each variable 
Concepts Out-degree In-degree Centrality Transmitter Receiver Ordinary 
Israel 5.25 1.25 6.50 - - 1 
U.S. 5.50 1.50 7.00 - - 1 
Saudi Arabia 6.50 3.25 9.75 - - 1 
Iran 3.75 2.75 6.50 - - 1 
Qatar 5.50 3.25 8.75 - - 1 
Economic 
problems 4.25 5.00 9.25 - - 1 
Social structure 4.50 3.25 7.75 - - 1 
Religious problem 4.00 5.75 9.75 - - 1 
Lack of political 
pluralism 4.50 3.75 8.25 - - 1 
Shiites of Yemen 2.50 10.00 12.50 - - 1 
Yemeni 
government 5.50 7.50 13.00 - - 1 
Crisis 4.75 9.25 14.00 - - 1 
 
 
A STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF WARS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND  





5.1. Table 6 shows that in Yemen, the crisis has the highest centrality (14) 
 
As the fuzzy map suggests, the crisis so far led to hundreds of deaths on both sides and 
homelessness of thousands of families. The crisis has affected almost all the factors and over 
time has brought about new variables, elements, and actors into the conflict. War in Yemen, 
has brought about economic paralysis, social structural gap, and more appearance of 
religious and ethnic– tribal divisions. The crisis has also weakened the government. Turning 
the army against the people who have quickly been turned into “insurgents” has diminished 
the regime’s legitimacy. 
             
5.2. The government has the second highest centrality (13) 
 
Yemeni crisis is primarily a domestic problem and the government is responsible to 
manage it. In addition, government with its mechanism and devices even with the regional 
and international actors’ desire to meddle in its internal affairs, was able to manage it and 
prove its goodwill to its people who are doubtful about its policies.  
The Shiites of Yemen have the highest in-degree (10), which indicates that they receive 
the highest influence from other factors. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has the highest out-degree (6.5) which shows that it has 
the highest effect on the other factors. The following points are noteworthy with respect to 
Saudi Arabia’s meddling in the Yemeni conflict: 
1. Saudi Arabia has three Yemeni provinces, namely ‘Asir, Najran, and Jizan, under its 
occupation. According to the Ta’if accord of 1934 between the high ranking officials of the 
two countries, Riyadh was obliged to return the three provinces to Yemen by 1954.  
However, it has continued to occupy these provinces by renewing the accord in 1954, 1974, 
and 2004. It has been suggested that by consecutively extending the Ta’if accord, Saudi 
Arabia has practically annexed these three provinces. 
2. Saudi Arabia and Yemen are the only two countries in the Middle East that have not 
demarcated their borders, due to the multiplicity of border and territorial disputes. In fact, 
Saudi Arabia has forever coveted Yemen’s territory since its independence. This problem has 
led to the outbreak of a conflict every two years. 
3. Saudi Arabia occupies several Yemeni islands in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The 
Saudi military forces captured the Yemeni island of Deohurap 10 years ago and declared that 
unless Yemen evacuated ‘Ashiq island, which belongs to Yemen, Saudi Arabia would 
continue to hold on to Deohurap Island. In the same year, in 1998, Saudi Arabia captured 
another Yemeni island - al-Duwaimah in the Red Sea - by force. The Saudis now occupy a 
total of 10 Yemeni islands (Zare’e 2009; Sultan 1996). 
Finally, the lowest out-degree belongs to the Shiites (2.5), which indicates that this 
variable has the least influence on other variables and factors.  
Other factors that have been considered influential in other researches appear to have had 
less impact in continuity or resolution of crisis, according to the fuzzy cognitive map. For 
example, Qatar’s attempts of mediation, because of the abuse of this mediation by interested 
parties in crisis, have been revoked. Analysis shows that this factor may be magnified. At the 
same time, another factor, despite its high impact, may not be seen. Figure 2 shows the fuzzy 
cognitive map of the Yemeni crisis. 
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Figure 2. The complete fuzzy cognitive map 
 
In the above figure, the size of each variable has been determined based on the magnitude of 
its centrality. For example, the crisis has the highest centrality. The grey colored variables 
signify internal factors and the white variables represent external factors. Since the two 
variables “crisis” and the “Yemeni government” which are among the internal factors have 
the highest centrality, they are illustrated with a darker color. Also the negative causal paths 
and the positive paths are shown by dots and lines, respectively. The fuzzy weights of the 





The goal of this research has been to explore the roots of the six stages of the war of 
Yemeni government and the Shiites of that country. Through a literature review, the authors 
noted that no research has comprehensively studied the roots of these wars and that all of the 
analyses have focused only on a few factors of the war. Moreover, given the complexity of 
the issue which began six years ago and that the crisis continues to escalate every year, a 
fuzzy cognitive map has been used for the analysis of the crisis. As the fuzzy cognitive map 
of the Yemeni crisis shows, the phenomena of the crisis and the Yemeni government have 
the highest degree of centrality. So far, the crisis has led to the dislocation of hundreds of 
thousands of households and the death of many people from those who are non-parties to the 
conflict. The crisis has inevitably dragged other regional and international players into the 
fighting and disrupted life in northern Yemen. In addition, a large number of the Yemeni 
population have become refugees who, could have been a source of national economic and 
political strength. The second important point is that the Yemeni government has the greatest 
centrality in the fuzzy analysis. As the Shiites argue, if the Yemeni government had 
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prevented the anti-sectarian activities of the Salafis in the Shiites’ provinces or if it did not 
exacerbate the sectarian differences by siding with one of the parties, and instead provided 
the Yemeni Shiites with the opportunity to peacefully express and pursue their demands, and 
accomplished this independently, the flames of war would have most probably receded. 
According to the fuzzy analysis, the actions of the Yemeni government, and the 
weaknesses and faults in its dealing with the crisis have increased the intensity of the crisis 
inasmuch as it has made the crisis into a factor that directly affects the other factors. The 
crisis has become so central that it determines the policies of the government and external 
forces. Hence, the Yemeni government must think about managing the crisis, instead of 
being affected by it and intensifying the situation’s complexity by adding other external 
actors. In this context, the actions of the government can be considered as the main cause of 
the crisis. 
According to the resulting cognitive map, Saudi Arabia has the highest effect on the other 
factors. The present paper considers Saudi Arabia’s meddling in the crisis, and generally, the 
influence that the said government exercises on the Yemeni government and society, as 
another reason for the prolongation of the crisis. 
Saudi Arabia’s intervention has also counteracted the Qatari mediation. If Saudi Arabia 
had helped the Yemeni government to overcome its numerous economic problems instead of 
providing it with military support, it could have secured its southern borders. It also could 
have taken a positive step toward the settlement of the crisis in Yemen. 
The Yemeni government, in the first place, and international organizations, in the second 
place, can gradually neutralize the effect of the second cause of the crisis, namely the direct 
intervention of Saudi government, and observe its impact on the development of the situation. 
In terms of methodology, this study showed a way to identify factors influencing a 
phenomenon and to understand the role of factors, in order to provide better context and 
awareness in making decisions during crises. By eliminating the factor that has more effect 
in the fuzzy cognitive map, and measuring its effect on the new map, this method can help 
decision-makers adopt policies that can help mitigate the crisis in the real world. 
Although this paper was been written before the recent developments of Yemen with 
respect to the Arab Spring, the factors affecting the crisis of the wars between the 
government and the Shiites of Yemen have continued to be at play in the present crisis and 
continue to exacerbate the situation. 
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